College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

Conferences, Events, and Lectures

1993

Hot Topics and Practical Tips in Estate Planning
Edward Jay Beckwith

Repository Citation
Beckwith, Edward Jay, "Hot Topics and Practical Tips in Estate Planning" (1993). William & Mary Annual Tax Conference. 253.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax/253

Copyright c 1993 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax

MARSHALL-WYTHE SCHOOL OF LAW
OF THE
THE COLLEGE OF WILUAM AND MARY
AND
THE TAXATION SECTION OF THE VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION
AND
THE TAXATION SECTION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR
Presents
THIRTY-NINTH
WILLIAM AND MARY TAX CONFERENCE
THE CLINTON TAX AGENDA

"HOT TOPICS AND PRACTICAL TIPS
IN
ESTATE PLANNING"

By
Edward Jay Beckwith, Esq.
Partner
BAKER & HOSTETLER
Washington, D.C.
Cleveland and Columbus, Ohio
Denver, Colorado
Houston, Texas
Long Beach and Los Angeles, California
Orlando, Florida

QCpafg4
Te

1993, FAWda Jay Beukw
refms inemImq dbt ofMp

i=deto Howard II. 7Zily,Faq. 1'num,,M bMUw bMi*
f
Mr. Zariis
Itr -w& i- p
"Te Year In Reiew.An ]AIMe P's
l~ipetfive Of Ta, Devdequift. A" wim tin me s h
may irst tm of Mr. Zarimla.
Amy ewnn tE= W be F '=etlef
a-e
t e nu.

"HOT TOPICS AND PRACTICAL TIPS IN ESTATE PLANNING"

by
Edward Jay Beckwith, Esq.

I.

INCOME TAXES

A.

Code* § 1.

Income Tax Rates.

1993 Tax Act Raises
Rates.

and Compresses

Estate

and

Trust

On August 10, 1993, President Clinton signed into law the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 , a comprehensive budget package
that included various taxation provisions.

Under the Act, the income tax rates for estates and
trusts are as follows:
$0-1,500:
$1,500-3,500:
$3,500-5,500:
$5,500-7,500:
Over $7,500:

15% of taxable income
$225 plus 28% of the excess over $1,500
$785 plus 31% of the excess over 3,500
$1,405 plus 36% of the excess over $5,500
$2,125 plus 39.6% of the excess over
$7,500 (after 10% surtax)

The Act retains the maximum statutory rate of 28% for net
capital gains.
inflation.

The tax bracket thresholds will be indexed for

The new rates are effective for taxable years beginning

after 1992.
Under the Act, individuals (but not estates and trusts)
may elect to pay additional 1993 taxes caused by the change in
rates, without interest, over three years.

*All references to the "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended.
"All references to the "Act" are to the Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993.

Note.

The compressed rates for estates and trusts add

another reason to consider making distributions to current income
beneficiaries.
marginal

Generally, individuals will not reach the 39.6%

bracket

until

their

taxable

income

exceeds

$250,000

whereas estates and trusts will be subjected to the surtax on all
taxable income over $7,500.

B.

Code § 55.

Increased ANT Rates and Exemption Amount

The Act increases the AMT exemption for estates and
trusts from $20,000 to $22,500.

It also provides that the first

$87,500 of alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI) in excess of
the exemption will be taxed at a rate of 26%.

All AMTI which

exceeds $87,500 plus the exemption will be taxed at a rate of 28%.
The new rates and exemption amount are effective for
taxable years beginning after 1992.

C.

Code § 67.
2% Floor on Miscellaneous Itemized Deductions.
Trustee's Investment Advisory Fees Deductible Without
Regard to 2% Limitation.
O'Neill Irrevocable Trust v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S.T.C.

50,332 (6th Cir. 6/1993), rev'g 98 T.C. No. 17 (1992).

A grantor

created an irrevocable trust for the benefit of certain family
members.

The trustees hired investment advisers and paid them

$15,374 for advice on the management of $4,500,000 of assets.

The

trustees deducted the full amount paid, but the IRS said that the
fees were deductible only to the extent that they exceeded 2% of
-3-

the trust's income, after deducting the distributions deduction.
Reversing the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit held for the taxpayer.
The Court noted that applicable state law

(Ohio) requires the

trustees to invest the trust assets in the manner of a "prudent
investor,"

and this obligated the trustees to hire professional

advisers,

if

they were not

investment matters.

themselves

sufficiently expert

in

Because state law obligated the trustees to

employ investment advisers, the court held that the expense was one
"which would not have been incurred if the property were not held
in such trust."

D.

Code § 103.

1.

Income Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds.

Insurance-Holding Partnership Sustains Partnership
Classification, Avoiding Transfer-for-Value Rule.

Ltr. Rul. 9309021.

Three individuals signed a cross--

purchase buy-sell agreement with respect to the stock of their
closely-held corporation.
held by

a partnership

insurance policies.

The buy-out was funded with insurance

formed

exclusively to manage the

life

The IRS said that the entity was a partnership

for tax purposes, because it lacked the corporate characteristics
of centralized management and limited liability.

Further, the

transfer-for-value rule would not apply with respect to exchanges
of

the

policies

under

the

partnership

agreement

insureds were partners in the partnership.

because

the

The life insurance

proceeds received by a partner as a result of the death of the
other partner increased the receiving partner's distributive share
as tax-exempt income and increased his basis in his partnership
-4-

interest.

Accordingly, the life insurance proceeds received by a

partner would not be taxable to the extent that such proceeds did
not

exceed

his

adjusted

basis

in

his

partnership

interest

immediately before the distribution.
Note.
become

more

The use of a partnership for this purpose has

common.

partner/stockholder
partnership

to

interest,

Of

course,

die

includes

including

the

estate

the

value

a proportionate

of

the

first

of his

or

her

share

of

the

proceeds on his-or her own life.

E.

Code § 170.
1.

Charitable Gifts.

Act provides Permanent AMT Relief for Charitable
Contributions of Appreciated Property.

Recently, if appreciated property was contributed to
charity, the appreciation was treated as an item of tax preference
for purposes

of the

alternative minimum tax

(AMT).

The Act

eliminates this preference treatment for contributions of tangible
personal property made after June 30, 1992 and contributions of all
other appreciated property made after 1992.

However, the change

does not apply to any carryover for contributions made before these
effective dates.

2.

Act Requires New Confirmation of Charitable Gifts.

The Act requires a taxpayer

claiming any

charitable

contribution deduction of $250 or more to obtain a contemporaneous
written acknowledgement of the donation from the charity.

The

acknowledgement should include a recitation of the amount of cash
-5-

contributed as well as description (but not a valuation) of all
noncash contributions plus a description (and good faith estimate
of value) of any goods or services provided as consideration for
the contribution.
The Act requires charities to inform donors of such socalled quid pro quo contributions (in excess of $75) (other than
intangible religious benefits) of the amount of the contribution
that is deductible.

Failure to make the disclosure is penalized

by $10 per contribution fines, up to $5,000 for a particular fundraising event or contribution.
These provisions apply to contributions made after 1993.
3.

Post-Gift

Transactions

Can

Be

Used

in

Valuing

Closely-Held Stock Given to University.
Krapf v.
10/1992).

U.S.,

1992-2 U.S.T.C.

50,537

(Fed.

Cir.

The founder of a corporation gave some of his shares in

the company to a university.

The taxpayer valued the stock at

$10.00 per share, based on the amounts paid to two employees when
the corporation repurchased their shares a year earlier.
years

later, the stock

transactions,

including

contributed shares.

was
one

sold for
sale

by

$0.40 per
the

share

university

Three
in two
of

the

The following year, however, the stock was

again sold for $10.00 per share.

The IRS said that the stock was

worthless when contributed, and the Claims Court found that it had
a value of $4.34 per share.

The Federal Circuit reversed and re-

manded the case, finding that the post-gift events were properly
considered, but incorrectly evaluated by the trial court.
-6-

P.

Code § 408.

IRA Roll-Overs.

IRA Received Through Estate and Inter Vivos Power of
Appointment Trust Could Be Rolled-Over.
Ltr. Rul. 9235058.
his estate.

A decedent's IRA was made payable to

The beneficiary of the estate was an irrevocable trust

that, on the decedent's death, divided into marital and nonmarital
shares.

The IRA was allocated to a marital trust, which was

revocable by the decedent's widow.

The widow then terminated the

trust, distributed the assets to herself, and rolled them into an
IRA, within 60 days of the distribution from the IRA.

The IRS held

that the widow's right to revoke the trust made her the trust's
owner, and that the payment would be treated as having been made
to the widow.
Consider a marital power of appointment trust when

Note.

there is a significant IRA balance.

Alternatively, the IRA can be

made payable outright to the surviving spouse, with the trust as
the alternate beneficiary, permitting a disclaimer if the trust
format is preferable at the time.
G.

Code § 453B.

Disposition of Installment Obligations.

Automatic Termination of SCIN is a Disposition.
Estate of Frane v. Comm'r, 93-2 U.S.T.C.

50,386 (8th

Cir. 7/1993), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 98 T.C. 341 (1992).
The decedent sold his wholly-owned corporation to his four children
in exchange

for four 20 year self-canceling installment notes

-7-

(SCINs).

The decedent's life expectancy exceeded the term of the

notes, but the decedent died two years after the sale.
The Tax Court held that the death of the obligee amounted
to a disposition under Code § 453B(f), and that the untaxed capital
gain was income to the decedent's estate.

The Tax Court said that

the termination of the note was a disposition, even though it did
not involve an actual transfer or specific release by the will.
Because it was income to the estate on account of the seller's
death, the Court reasoned the gain was not IRD.

This decision was

reviewed by the entire court.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part,
holding that the gain had to be recognized by the decedent's
estate, rather than on the decedent's final income tax return. The
Court refused to treat the cancellation of a SCIN differently from
any other form of cancellation of an installment obligation merely
because there was no independent act of cancellation.

The Court

also held that the basis of the obligors in the assets exchanged
for the obligation reflected the full value of the note instead of
the value actually paid.

H.

Code § 664.

Charitable Remainder Trusts.

Discretionary Trust Can Be Beneficiary of Charitable
Remainder Trust.
Ltr.
trusts,

Rul.

9328041.

A decedent's will created three

a 5-year and a 10-year charitable annuity trust and a

20-year charitable unitrust.
trust was one of several

The noncharitable beneficiary of each
discretionary
-8-

trusts

created

for the

benefit of members of the decedent's family. The remainder of each
trust was a charitable organization.

The IRS ruled that the trusts

were qualified charitable remainder trusts, noting that as long as
the term of the noncharitable interest is a number of years, rather
than someone's lifetime, the beneficiary can be another trust,
rather than one or more individuals.

I.

Code §§ 671-679.
1.

Grantor Trust Rules.

Right to Add Descendants Creates Grantor
Status for S Corporation Trust.

Ltr. Rul. 9304017.
S corporation stock.

Trust

A decedent created a trust to hold

The decedent gave a nonadverse

(but not

necessarily independent) trustee a broad power to pay income and
principal among the decedent's children, in such shares as the
trustee deemed appropriate. The trustee also was granted the power
to

add

and

remove

as

beneficiaries

any

of

the

decedent's

descendants, and the right to renounce this power at any time.

At

the death of both the decedent and the decedent's spouse, the trust
would divide

into

separate shares

for each of the decedent's

then-living children who then are beneficiaries of the trust.

The

IRS ruled that the trust was a grantor trust under Code § 674,
owned entirely by the decedent. At the decedent's death, the trust
would create separate QSSTs for the decedent's children.
2.

Right
to
Substitute Assets
Creates
Grantor
Charitable Lead Unitrust With Double Deductibility.

Ltr. Rul. 9247024.

An individual created a charitable

lead unitrust which, to secure an accelerated income tax deduction,
-9-

needed to be a grantor trust.

Code § 170(f) (2) (B).

To make the

unitrust a grantor trust, the individual granted a related party
the nonfiduciary right to substitute assets of equivalent value for
any assets held by the trust, giving the trustee the independent
right to verify the equivalency of values.

The IRS said that the

trust would be a grantor trust under § 675(4), and no portion of
it would be included in the grantor's gross estate under §§ 2036,
2037, 2038, 2041, or 2042, on account of the power to substitute
assets.
Note.
the gift

This creates an unusual trust that qualifies for

tax charitable

deduction as

a gift of

a guaranteed

unitrust interest, but also provides an accelerated income tax
deduction.

J.

Code § 691.
1.

Income in Respect of a Decedent.

Proceeds of Sale of Real Estate Pursuant to Option
Agreement Were Not IRD.

Ltr. Rul. 9325029.

A decedent died owning certain real

estate subject to an option agreement granted by the decedent prior
to the decedent's death and exercisable only after the decedent's
death.

After the decedent's death, the real estate was sold

pursuant to the option.

The IRS ruled that the gain was not IRD,

because at decedent's death, the decedent was not unconditionally
entitled to the proceeds of the sale.

The IRS also noted that the

real estate could not be conveyed unless the option holders first
executed a sales contract after exercising the option.

-10-

Notb.

The IRS also noted that the basis of the real

estate in the hands of the estate was its fair market value on the
date of death, taking into account the existence of the option.
2.

Disclaimed Retirement Benefits
Recipient, not Disclaimant.

Ltr. Rul. 9319029.

Taxable

to

the

A widow disclaimed a portion of her

deceased husband's profit-sharing plan by a disclaimer that was
qualified under state law and § 2518.
disclaimed

benefits

recipient,

not

the

were

IRD,

and

disclaimant.

If

The IRS

taxable
the

to

estate

said that the
the

ultimate

of a decedent

transmits-the right to IRD to another person who would be required
to include that income when received in his or her gross income,
only the transferee must include that amount in gross income.

The

widow's disclaimer satisfied this requirement because it was a
transfer at death to persons pursuant to their right to receive it
by reason of the death of the decedent or by bequest, devise or
inheritance of the decedent.
3.

Appreciation in Value of Both Series E and Series
H Savings Bonds is IRD, Accelerated on Funding
Pecuniary Share.

Ltr. Rul. 9315016.

A decedent funded a revocable trust

with both Series E U.S. Savings Bonds and Series H bonds, acquired
in an exchange for Series E bonds.

When the decedent died, the

value of the bonds exceeded the decedent's purchase price, and the
bonds were distributed to satisfy a pecuniary charitable bequest
to a private foundation.

The IRS ruled that the appreciation in

value of the bonds represented accrued interest and was, therefore,
IRD, and that the distribution of the bonds in satisfaction of a
-11-

pecuniary legacy, even to a charity, caused the trust to recognize
the previously-untaxed income.
194; and Kenan v.

K.

Citing Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 C.B.

Comm'r, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).

Code § 1001-1035.
Gain.
1.
Ltr.

Recognition of Gain and Amount of

Exchanges of Life Insurance Contracts Were Tax Pree
Despite Differing Nationalities of Insurers.
Rul.

9319024.

A

U.S.

citizen

exchanged

a

nonvariable deferred annuity contract issued by a U.S. insurer for
a nonvariable
insurer.

deferred

annuity

contract

issued

by

a

foreign

The U.S. annuity was to begin on September 1, 2033, and

the foreign annuity was to begin on September 20, 2002.
policies are annuities under Code § 1035(b) (2).
the exchange

Both

The IRS ruled that

is tax-free under § 1035 because the legislative

history indicates that a contract is life insurance without regard
to the nationality of the issuer.
2.

Swap of Joint and Survivor Life Insurance Policy for
Single Life Policy is Tax-Deferred, When One Insured
Is Already Deceased.

Ltr. Rul. 9248013.

An individual created an irrevocable

life insurance trust to buy a joint and survivor (or "last to die")
insurance policy on his life and the life of his spouse.

The

spouse died first, causing the policy cash value to grow significantly.

The trustee wanted to exchange the policy for a universal

life policy on the life of the widower alone.

The IRS held that

such an exchange would be tax-deferred under Code § 1035, in part

-12-

because the spouse's death meant that there would be no change in
the insureds.
Note.

If

both

insureds

were

still

alive when the

exchange occurred, the exchange should not qualify under § 1035,
because there would no longer be an identity of insureds.

L.

Code § 1361-1367.
Corporation Trust and Basic S
Corporation Requirements.
1.
Even a Remote Possibility of Improper Distribution
Disqualified Separate Share Trust as QSST.
Rev. Rul.

93-31,

1993-17

I.R.B.,

p.

5

(4/1993).

decedent created a trust to hold stock of an S corporation.

A

The

trust provided for income to be paid to A and B in equal shares,
but there was a remote possibility that one of the beneficiaries
would receive more than its proportionate share of trust corpus.
The possibility was so remote as not to prevent application of the
separate share rule under Code §§ 663(c) and 1361(d) (3).

However,

the IRS said that the requirements of § 1361(d)(3)(A)(ii) must be
met for a trust to be a QSST, and even a remote possibility that
the corpus allocated to the separate share of one beneficiary could
be allocated to the other was sufficient to disqualify the trust.
Thus, the IRS ruled that the trust terms must provide that any
corpus

distributed

during

the

life

of

the

current

income

beneficiary be distributed only to that beneficiary.
Note. The IRS also noted that if the application of this
ruling

caused

an

inadvertent

termination

of an

election, relief could be requested under § 1362(f).
-13-

S-corporation

2.

Income Beneficiary Taxed on Gain From Sale of S
Corporation Stock by QSST.

Rev. Rul. 92-84, 1992-40 I.R.B., p. 24 (10/1992).
sold all or part of its S corporation stock.

A QSST

Local trust law

requires that the gain or loss on the sale of capital assets be
allocated to corpus, rather than income.

The IRS said that, as the

income beneficiary is treated as the owner of the portion of the
trust consisting of the S-corporation stock under Code § 678, the
income beneficiary must take into income any item of gain or loss
directly related to the stock.

The IRS said that the gain or loss

on the stock sale was directly related to the stock and therefore
clearly taxable to the income beneficiary.
Note. The IRS did not discuss what happens when the sale
is on the installment basis and the trust ceases to be a QSST.

It

is far less clear that the income beneficiary is taxable on the
gains recognized in the year after the trust no longer owns any S
corporation stock.
3.

Individual Retirement Account Can
Eligible Subchapter S Shareholder.

Rev. Rul. 92-73, 1992-37 I.R.B.,

Never

Be

p. 7 (9/1992).

An
An

individual owned stock of an S corporation, and assigned it to a
trust that constituted an Individual Retirement Account, under Code
§ 408(a).

The IRS ruled that a trust that is used as an IRA cannot

be an eligible S corporation shareholder.

The IRS noted that the

trust cannot be a QSST because the beneficiary of a QSST must elect
to have the trust treated as a beneficiary-controlled trust under
§ 678, so that the beneficiary is taxed on all trust income cur-14-

§ 1361(c) (2)(A)(i).

rently.

Alternatively, were the trust a

grantor trust under § 671, the participant would be the grantor and
taxed on all trust income currently.

IRAs, on the other hand, are

The beneficiary of an IRA is

taxed differently under § 408.

taxable only when distributions are made, and then under the rules
Thus, the rules for taxation of IRAs are inconsistent

of § 72.

with those for S corporation trusts.
4.

Crummey Demand Power Creates
Corporation Trust Via Code § 678.

Ltr. Rul. 9311021.

an

Eligible

S

An individual created a trust with

separate shares for each of the individual's three children.

The

trustee had discretion to pay income and principal to each child
under an ascertainable standard. When each child reaches 40, the
trust funds will be paid to him or her outright.
before

40,

his

or

her

share

will

be

held

If the child dies
for

that

child's

descendants. Each child is given a Crummey demand power over all
gifts to the trust.

The grantor represented that no gifts would

be made in excess of the quantitative limitations on the Crummey
power.

The IRS ruled that the demand power made the child the

trust's owner under Code § 678(a), and that the child was the owner
of the trust under §§ 677 and 678(a)(2).
was given a nonfiduciary power to

Furthermore, each child

remove and replace assets,

causing grantor trust status under § 675(4).

Because the child

owned the entire trust under these sections, the trust was an
eligible S corporation stockholder under § 1361(c)(2)(A)(i).
Note.

If gifts may exceed $5,000 per year, it is also

a good idea to give each child a limited testamentary power of
-15-

appointment over the remainder interest. This would avoid causing
a taxable gift by the child when his or her demand power lapses
unexercised. This appears not to have been done or ruled upon here.
Further Note.

This is an excellent alternative to the

QSST, since the trustee need not be required to distribute income
or principal currently.

Furthermore, if the beneficiary is given

a general testamentary power of appointment over the entire trust
fund, the trust will qualify for the annual exclusion under both
the gift and generation-skipping transfer tax rules.

K.

Income Tax Liens.
1.

Code § 6654. Simplified Safe Harbor Provision for
Estimated Tax.

The Act simplifies the safe harbor for avoiding a penalty
on underpayment of estimated tax based on the prior year's tax by
submitting a provision that if the prior year's adjusted gross
income exceeds $150,000, then a penalty may be avoided by paying
110% of the prior year's tax rather than 100%.

The Act retains the

safe harbor that a penalty may be avoided by paying 90% of the
current year's tax.
The new provision is effective for estimated tax payments
applicable to taxable years beginning after 1993.

-16-

11.

ESTATE TAXES
A.

Code § 2001.
1.

Estate Tax Rates.

Act Makes 55% Rate Permanent.

The Act makes permanent the
generation-skipping transfer tax rate.

55%

top estate, gift,

and

The rates are effective for

decedent's dying, gifts made and generation-skipping transfers made
after 1992.

2.

Fourth Circuit Agrees That IRS Can Revalue Gifts
After Death.

Levin

v.

Comm'r,

3/1993), aff'g sub nom.
1991-208

(1991).

93-1

U.S.T.C.

60,128

(4th Cir.

Estate of Prince v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.

A decedent gave bonds issued under the 1937

Housing Act to her children, filing gift tax returns and reporting
the transfers as exempt from gift tax.

The 3-year period for

assessing gift taxes expired before the decedent died.

The IRS

said that the bonds had a substantial value for gift tax purposes,
and revalued them for purposes of setting the estate tax rate under
Code § 2001.

The Fourth Circuit,

affirming the Tax Court,

said

that the amount of the decedent's "adjusted taxable gifts" could
be revalued despite the expiration of the statute of limitations
on the gift tax.

The statute of limitations on the gift tax does

not extend to the revaluation of gifts for estate tax purposes.

B.

Code § 2031.
1.

CPA' s Marketability and Minority Discounts Rejected.

Estate
10/1992),

Valuation.

of Berg v. Comm'r,

976

F.2d

1163

(8th Cir.

aff'g in part and rev'g in part 26.92% interest in a
-17-

closely-held real estate holding and management company. The value
of the company's underlying assets was approximately $4,000,000,
so

the value

$1,000,000.

of

the decedent's

stock, before

discounts,

was

The estate claimed a 60% discount for lack of control

and lack of marketability.

The estate tax return included an

explanation of the discount, but not an appraisal.
estate merely

said that

it was

Rather, the

relying on earlier Tax Court

decisions sustaining a 60% discount for the stock of a real estate
holding company. The Tax Court rejected the estate appraisals in
favor of the IRS approach, which looked at comparable publicly
traded real estate investment trusts and which concluded that a 30%
discount

(20% lack of control;

appropriate.

10%

lack of marketability) was

The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court, noting

that the estate had failed to prove that the Tax Court's determination was "clearly erroneous." The Eighth Circuit said that the
Tax Court's opinion showed a careful weighing of the substance of
the appraisers' reports and the backgrounds of those who gave the
expert testimony.
Note. The Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in part,
finding that the estate was not liable for an addition to tax for
understating its tax liability because it had reasonably relied on
its accountant's valuation of the stock.
2.

Buy-Sell Agreement Price Did Not Fix Estate Tax
Values Because It Was Adopted Primarily For
Testamentary Purposes.

Estate
(12/1992).

of

Lauder

v.

Comm'r,

T.C.

Memo.

1992-736

A decedent owned voting and nonvoting stock of EJL
-18-

Corporation, the holding corporation for. Estee Lauder, Inc.,

an

internationally-known fragrance manufacturer. In 1974, at the suggestion of one of the decedent's sons, the stockholders entered
into a cross-purchase buy-sell agreement.

The purchase price was

set by formula based on the book value of the stock, excluding the
value of

intangible assets.

The date of death value of

the

decedent's stock under the agreement was $4,111 per share, and the
value listed on the estate tax return was $4,300 per share.

The

IRS asserted that the stock was worth $13,250 per share, and
assessed a deficiency of $42,702,597.

The Tax Court held that the

agreement did not fix estate tax values, because it was used as a
device to shift the value of the business to the children at a
bargain price.

The court noted that the decedent was in his 70's

when the agreement was signed (although he lived another 9 years);
no appraisal was used to set the formula; the parties did not
attempt to negotiate the formula at all; and the formula excluded
intangibles, even tholgh the intangible assets of the corporation
were immensely valuable.
3.

Fractional Interest in Real Estate Given Only Small
Discount.

Ltr. Rul. 9336002.

A decedent died owning an undivided

one-half interest in a ranch valued at $1,311,845.

The decedent's

appraisers claimed a 30 percent discount against the proportionate
value of the whole property.

The IRS noted that a buyer could sue

to partition the property with relative ease, and therefore said
that if the discount were allowable at all, it must be limited to

-19-

the estimated costs of partition..
Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
Note.
opinions

that

1986-542 (1986).
This

position

have granted

interests in real

Citing Estate of Fittl v.

estate.

is

inconsistent

significant
The

with

discounts

for

numerous
partial

discounts are always based on

comparable sales of partial interests, and the fact that most
buyers do not want to sue for partition, and many properties are
difficult, if not impossible, to partition.

In such cases, the

buyer of a partial interest really only acquires the right to force
a sale to a third party and a right to a share of the proceeds.

C.

Code § 2035.

Transfers Within Three Years of Death.

Life Insurance Policy Purchased Through
Contract Excluded From Gross Estate.
Ltr. Rul. 9323002.

Re-executed

The decedent initially applied for

two life insurance policies, listing herself as "proposed insured"
and naming her estate as the beneficiary of the policies.

The

space for "owner

The

other than the insured"

was left blank.

application stated that it would "take effect only if the first
full premium is paid and [the] policy issued and delivered to the
owner." Later that same year, but before any premium had been paid,
the decedent decided that the policies should be owned by her two
sons,

and she filed a supplementary application under which the

sons were named owners and beneficiaries.
the supplementary application.

No premium was paid with

Thereafter, a premium was paid and

the policies were issued to the two sons.

The IRS ruled that the

decedent never held any economic ownership or contractual rights
-20-

in the policies, and that the three-year rule of Code § 2035(d) was
never triggered.

The IRS noted that applicable-state law (Texas)

did not give the decedent any rights over the policy until it is
issued.

The IRS noted that an insurance policy application is

merely an offer to buy insurance, and that the application is not
enough to convey incidents of ownership until it is accepted.

The

IRS noted also that premium rates had increased since the decedent
had filed the original application, but that the insurance company
agreed

to

use

the

more

favorable

rates with

respect to

the

supplementary application. However, the transfer of this favorable
premium

rate

from

the decedent

to the policy

owners did

not

constitute the transfer of an incident of ownership in the policy
itself.

D.

Code §§ 2036-2038.
1.

Gifts with Retained Interests.

Gift-Leaseback Recharacterized as a Retained Life
Estate.

Estate of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 93-2 U.S.T.C.
Cir. 8/1993).

60,145 (2d

A decedent sold her personal residence to her only

child and the child's spouse for $270,000.

Decedent forgave the

$20,000 down payment and took back a $250,000 mortgage.

Decedent

then leased the house back for five years for an amount that was
approximately equal to the mortgage payments.

Decedent was then

82 years of age and suffering from cancer, such that she was
unlikely to live for five years.

Decedent forgave each principal

installment as they became due, and in her will, the decedent
forgave the outstanding debt.

The Second Circuit, affirming a
-21-

decision of the Tax Court, found that there was an understanding
between parent and child that the parent would be allowed to live
in the house for the rest of her life, and that no payments would
have to be made on the notes.

The court recharacterized the

transaction as a gift with a retained life estate, noting that no
payments were made on the debt, that the child never occupied the
house, and that the debt amortization and rental payments were
substantially the same.
2.

Virginia Code § 11-9.5 Authorizing Gifts by
Attorney-in-Fact Is Retroactively Valid for Estate
Tax Purposes.

Estate
(2/1993).

An individual

v.

Memo.

1993-41

executed a durable general

power of

of Ridenour

Comm'r, T.C.

attorney that did not specifically grant or deny the authority to
make gifts.

The attorney-in-fact made gifts on the individual's

behalf, consistent with a pattern of prior gifts.

The IRS, citing

Estate of Casey v. Comm'r, 948 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1991), viewed the
gifts

as unauthorized and voidable, and

included them in the

decedent's gross estate under Code § 2038(a).

The Tax Court,

however, said that Va. Code § 11-9.5 (Michie Supp. 1992), passed
by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor March 30, 1992,
had validated the gifts retroactively.

The court noted that the

Virginia General Assembly provided that this portion of the legislation was "declaratory of existing law." 1992 Va. Acts ch. 544.
The court focused on what the Virginia Supreme Court would conclude.
on the issue.

See Comm'r v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
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The

court indicated that Virginia law permits the General Assembly to
enact retroactive laws.
3.

Retention of General Partnership Interest in Family
Limited Partnership is Not a Retained Interest Under
Code § 2036(a).

Ltr. Rul. 9310039.

Husband and Wife created a family

limited partnership, to which the husband contributed $990,000 in
cash

for a 1% general partnership

interest and a 98%

limited

partnership interest, and the wife contributed $10,000 in cash for
a 1% limited partnership interest.
and

securities

and was

not

The partnership holds stocks

required

to

distribute

income

or

principal except in the discretion of the general partner, the
husband, or at termination.

All distributions will, however, be

made to the partners in proportion to their partnership interests.
Husband gave his limited partnership interests to the wife.

The

IRS ruled that the limited partnership interests are not includible
in

husband's

gross

estate under

Code

§ 2036(a),

despite the

husband's power to control the distribution of income as general
partner.

The IRS noted that under applicable state law

sachusetts)
partners.

each

partner

has

a

By analogy to U.S. v.

fiduciary

duty

to

the

(Masother

Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), the

IRS did not treat the general partnership interest as a retained
right to control income of the transferred interest.
Note.

This

is

an

important ruling,

since the

IRS's

previous ruling regarding gifts of limited partnership interests
by a general partner involved a partnership that generated no
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income. See Ltr. Rul. 9131006 (involving availability of the gift
tax annual exclusion).

E.

Code § 2041. Powers of Appointment.
1.
Power to Invade Principal for "Continued Comfort"#
is Not a General Power of Appointment.
Estate of Visserling v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S.T.C.

(10th Cir. 4/1993), rev'g 96 T.C. 749 (1991).
created a

trust

for

benefit

the

of

60,133

A decedent's mother

decedent

and

decedent's

siblings, naming the decedent and a bank as co-trustees.
trustees were empowered to pay the decedent principal
"continued

beneficiaries
education."

comfort,

support,

The

for the
or

maintenance,

The decedent died without ever exercising the power.

The Tenth Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, held that decedent did
not have a general power of appointment.

The court said that

"comfort" would

standard,

not

be

an

"continued comfort" was

an

ascertainable
ascertainable

standard

but

that

related

to

health, education, support, or maintenance.
2.

Retroactive Ohio Statute Assures That Trustee's
Beneficial Interest in Trust is a Limited Power of
Appointment.

Ltr. Rul. 9323028.

A husband's will created a trust and

named the wife and a bank as co-trustees.

The trustees had

discretion to distribute the income and accumulated income to the
wife and to their child for whom the trust was created. Ohio Rev.
Code § 1340.22 provides that a fiduciary cannot make discretionary
distributions to himself or herself unless the power is limited by
an ascertainable standard,, and that any such power that authorizes
-24-

discretionary distributions expressed in terms of "comfort" (among
other things) is limited by an ascertainable standard related to
the health, education, support and maintenance.

This statute was

enacted effective October 8, 1992, but it states that it was the
intention of the legislature that this rule would be a codification
of existing law.

The IRS said that the statute was declaratory of

existing Ohio law, and that the trust did not grant the wife a
general power of appointment over income or accumulated income.
3.

Power to Remove and Replace Corporate Trustee Avoids
Imputation of Power of Appointment.

Estate of Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. No. 21 (10/1993).

In

1979 the decedent executed three trust instruments establishing
irrevocable inter vivos trusts for the benefit of her children.
The grantor retained the right to remove the corporate trustee and
replace

it

with

another

corporate

"independent" from the decedent.

trustee

which

had

to

be

In each case, the trustee had

the authority to distribute principal and income to beneficiaries
essentially

unrestrained

by

an

ascertainable

standard.

The

decedent retained no other power or interest in the trusts other
than the right to make additional contributions.

The IRS asserted

that the trusts were includible in the decedent's gross estate
under § 2036(a)(2) or § 2038(a)(1) because in creating the trusts
she

reserved the

successor.

right

to

remove

the trustee

and

appoint a

The IRS argument was predicated on Rev. Rul. 79-353.

The Court concluded that Rev. Rul. 79-353 is "supported neither by
cogent argument nor by cited

cases supporting the

reached" and held for the taxpayer.
-25-

conclusion

F.

Code §§ 2053-2054.

1.

Estate Expenses and Losses.

No Deduction for Debts Owed
Unsupported by Consideration.

to

Children

When

Estate of Flandreau v. Comm'r, 93-1U.S.T.C. 1 60,137 (2d
Cir. 5/1993).

Decedent made a series of gifts to her sons and

daughters-in-law, and then borrowed the money back.

Each of the

12 promissory notes had a term of 15-years, despite the fact that
the decedent was already 70 years of age when she began the
gift-borrow back plan.

None of the notes bore interest or were

secured, and no repayments were ever actually made.

The IRS said

that no deduction was allowed to decedent's estate for the notes
because they were unsupported

by consideration.

Affirming

a

memorandum decision of the Tax Court, the Second Circuit held that
the circular nature of the transactions, including the fact that
decedent

would

have been 95

before

she

received

all

of

the

repayments, suggested a lack of genuine intent to create a debt.
Thus, no deduction was allowed under Code § 2053(c) (1) (A), because
the debts were not "contracted bona fide and for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth."
2.

Interest Expenses Paid from Estate Income Does Not
Reduce Residuary Estate.

Rev. Rul. 93-48, 1993-25 I.R.B. p. 9 (7/1993).

The IRS

said that it changed its position as a result of several court
rulings, and now holds that post-death interest paid by an estate
from

the

residuary estate may

be deducted

as

an

income

tax

deduction, without reducing the amount of the residuary estate for
-26-

estate tax purposes.

Therefore, a charitable or marital deduction

from the residuary estate will not be prejudiced by the payment of
interest from estate income, nor will such interest reduce the
available credit under Code § 2013.

G.

Code § 2055.
..

Charitable Deductions.

Administrative Expenses Paid from Estate
Reduce Charitable Deduction.

Burke v. U.S.,
8/1993).
probate

93-2

U.S.T.C.

60,146

(Fed.

Income
Cir.

Decedent's executor successfully petitioned the state
court

to permit

the payment of

estate

administrative

expenses from income, rather than from the principal of the estate.
Decedent's will directed the payment of administrative

expenses

from "the residuary estate" but with a clear goal of minimizing
estate and inheritance taxes.

A charity received the residuary

estate "after paying therefrom

...

all administration expenses."

Affirming the trial court's decision, the Federal Circuit held that
administrative expenses deducted out of income must reduce the
charitable deduction from the residuary bequest.

The Court said

that the gross estate, as defined under Code § 2031, is the sole
source for all administrative expenses, and any such expenses must
be accounted for as part of this estate, without regard to income
produced.
2.

Unlimited
Right
to
Make
Small
Preresiduary
Dispositions Disqualifies Charitable Residue.

Estate of Marine v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S.T.C.
Cir. 3/1993),

aff'g 97 T.C. 368
-27-

(1991).

60,131 (4th

Decedent's will left

several small specific bequests, including one to his housekeeper,
with a charitable residue to two universities.

To encourage the

housekeeper to stay in his employ, decedent changed his will to
give his personal representative discretion to make bequests of up
to

1%

of

decedent's

contributed to

gross

probate

estate

"to

persons

who

[decedent's) well-being" or who "were otherwise

helpful" to the decedent.

After decedent's death, the personal

representative made a few small bequests and then distributed the
residuary estate to charity. The Fourth Circuit, affirming the Tax
Court,

held

deductible.

that

the

charitable

residuary

bequest

was

not

The court noted that Regs. § 20.2055-2(a) denies a

charitable

bequest

of

a

remainder

interest

unless

it

is

ascertainable.

Since there was no limitation on how many 1%

bequests

be

could

left

to

noncharitable

beneficiaries,

the

residuary disposition was not ascertainable.
3.

Commutation of Defective Charitable Remainder Trust
Fails to Save Estate Tax Deduction.

Estate of Burdick v. Comm'r, 1992-2 U.S.T.C.
(9th

Cir.

11/1992),

aff'g

96

T.C.

168

(1991).

60,122
Decedent's

holographic will left his estate in trust, with income to be paid
to his brother, for his life, and the remainder then split between
his brother's children and certain charities.

The IRS disallowed

the deduction

when the

for the

charitable

interest,

executor

obtained the consent of all of the parties to a commutation of the
trust, giving the charity immediately the value of its
interest.

remainder

The executor then reasserted the deduction, but the IRS

reasserted its disallowance of the deduction.
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The Ninth Circuit

held

for

the

IRS,

and

said

that

the

only

way

in

which

a

nonqualified charitable remainder trust can be made qualified is
through a reformation pursuant to Code § 2055 (e)(3),

and that a

commutation occurring after the estate tax return was filed could
not save the charitable deduction.

H.

Code § 2056.
1.

Marital Deduction.

Federal Circuit Agrees That Marital Deduction is
Reduced by Administrative Expenses Paid From Income.

Fisher v. U.S.,
4/1993).

Decedent's

93-1 U.S.T.C.

personal

60,132

representative

administration expenses from estate income.

paid

(Fed.

Cir.

$38,694

of

The estate deducted

these expenses on the fiduciary income tax return. The IRS reduced
the amount of the marital deduction by this amount.

The estate

relied on Estate of Richardson v.

1193,

Comm'r, 89 T.C.

1201

(1987), and the IRS relied on Estate of Street v. Comm'r, 974 F.2d
723

(6th Cir. 1992).

The Federal Circuit agreed with the Sixth

Circuit, and held that Regs. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) applied directly and
required that administration expenses be reflected in the marital
deduction. The Federal Circuit agreed that administrative expenses
accrue at death

even though they may actually be paid

later.

Therefore, the administrative expenses must be reflected in the
gross estate that exists at death. If administrative expenses are
paid from the income of the estate that is earned after death, then
the

gross

estate is

larger than

it would have been

had the

administrative expenses been paid from the principal of the gross
estate.
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2.

Fifth Circuit Permits Ezecutor's Option On Whether
to Create QTIP.

Estate of Clayton, Jr. v. Comm'r, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir.
11/1992),

revsg 97 T.C. 327

(1991).

Husband's Will created a

marital trust for the wife (in which she had. an absolute income
interest), and a nonmarital trust for the benefit of the wife and
their children.

Husband's Will said that the executors (including

the wife, who was a co-executor), could by timely election, treat
any portion of the residue as qualifying for the estate tax marital
deduction under the QTIP rules, and that the portion not thus
deducted would be added to the nonmarital trust.

The IRS said that

none of the marital trust was deductible because of the executor's
power to deny the widow her income interest through an election.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed
and held for the taxpayer.

The Court reviewed the history of the

marital deduction and examined the wording of Code § 2056(b) (7).
The Court disagreed with the Tax Court over the "property" to which
the election applied.

The Tax Court had viewed the executor as

making a partial election with respect to the entire residuary
estate, and disallowed the marital deduction because part of the
property over which the election was made would pass to someone
other than the surviving spouse.

The Fifth Circuit said that the

executor's election only related to choosing a fractional share of
the residue.

The Court said that the law refers to the terms of

the property that "the executor elected to treat as Qualifying
Terminable Interest Property." § 2056(b)(7) (B)(i)(II).

(The same

language is contained in Prop. Regs. § 20.2056(b) -7(b)(3)).
-30-

Thus,

the focus is on the terms of the QTIP after the election, not
before.
3.

Interest Deducted on Estate Income Tax Return Does
Deduction--Administration
Marital
Reduce
Not
Expenses So Deducted Do.

Estate of Street

v. Comm'r, 974

F.2d 723

(6th Cir.

9/1992), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 56 T.C.M. 774 (1989).

A

decedent's estate left $10,000 to his estate and the balance to a
marital

deduction

trust.

The

estate

claimed

interest

and

administration expenses as deductions on the estate's fiduciary
income tax return, but did not use these items to reduce the estate
tax marital deduction.

The estate contended that these items were

payable from estate income, rather than principal, and therefore
did not reduce the marital deduction.

State law (the original

Uniform Principal and Income Act) did not state which expenses
should be paid from income and which from principal.

The Sixth

Circuit held that interest paid by the estate from income did not
reduce the marital deduction, but that administration expenses so
paid did reduce the marital deduction.

The Court said that the

interest payments accrued only after death, and thus could be paid
from income without reducing the marital deduction under Regs. §
20.2056 (b)-4(a).
(1987).

See Estate of Richardson v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1193

The Court said that administration expenses, however,

accrue effective to the date of death, and thus must reduce the
marital deduction whether paid from income or principal.
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I.

Estate Tax Procedures.
1.

Beneficiaries of Life Insurance Policies Liable for
Unpaid Estate Taxes and Interest, Even Though It
Exceeds Proceeds Received.

Baptiste, Jr. v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. No. 16 (3/1993).

The

proceeds of a life insurance on decedent's life were included in
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.

The

beneficiaries were personally liable for the taxes as transferees.
The total of tax due plus interest exceeded the proceeds received.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS that the beneficiaries were still
liable

for

the tax,

despite

Code

§ 6324(a)(2),

which

limits

transferee liability for unpaid estate tax and interest accrued
thereon that is owed by a transferor.

The Court held that the

limitation does not apply to transferee liability for interest
accrued on unpaid estate tax owed by a transferee.

Instead the

statute imposes a direct, personal and primary obligation on the
transferee.
2.
Rev.

Revenue.Procedure Permits Relief on Three Estate Tax
Elections.
Proc.

92-85,

1992-42

I.R.B.,

p.

32

(10/1992).

Relief is provided to taxpayers who reasonably and in good faith
fail to make certain timely elections, if relief does not put the
taxpayers in a better position than they would have been in had
they made

a

timely

election.

The

procedure

provides

for

an

automatic 12-month extension for the election to value qualified
real estate under Code § 2032A(d) (1),
qualified

payment

right

as

not
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the election to treat a

being

qualified

under

§

2701(c)(3)(c),

and the election to treat any distribution as a

qualified payment.

III. GIFT TAXES.
A.

Code § 2503.

Annual Exclusion.

Noncharitable Gifts by Check Can Be Completed Transfers
in Year That Check is Given to Donee, Even-Though Check
Not Cashed Until Following Year.
Estate of Metzger v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. No. 14 (3/1993).
Decedent's power of attorney authorized his son to make gifts from
decedent's

assets

to

decedent's

heirs

and

their

spouses.

Decedent's son wrote annual exclusion checks to*himself and his
wife on decedent's checking account.
December

14

The checks were written on

and deposited on December

31, but they were not

presented and accepted by the drawee bank until the following year.
The IRS contended that the gifts were completed only in the year
in which they were honored by the drawee bank, but the Tax Court
disagreed.

The Tax Court agreed that Maryland law treated a check

as a completed transfer only when the drawee bank accepted it, but
also held that the relation-back doctrine treats a gift by check
as a completed gift in the year in which the check is drawn, if (a)
the donor's intent can be clearly established, (b) delivery is
completed unconditionally, and (c) the check is presented in the
same year in which it is written.
Note.

This should also apply in the estate tax context,

and should be distinguished from situations in which the checks are
not

deposited

or

cashed

until
-33-

after

death,

or

in

-

which

circumstances suggest an understanding or arrangement to withhold
cashing the checks until after death.

B.

Code § 2511. Taxable Gifts.
IRS Continues to Equate Lack of
Gift-Giving.
Ltr. Rul. 9301001.

Assertiveness with

An individual created a corporation

with both voting common and voting preferred stock.

He gave his

children the common stock and retained the preferred stock that was
to pay a $3 noncumulative dividend on each share.

The market

return on preferred stock of new publicly-held corporations when
he created the corporation was 11.55%, but the yield on taxpayer's
shares was set at .0038%.

His voting control permitted him to

compel liquidation and receive $2,500,000, increase the dividend
rate on the preferred shares, or convert the preferred shares into
common stock.

The IRS ruled that he was making continuing gifts

to his children (the holders of common stock) when he acquiesced
to the corporation's not paying higher dividends.

C.

Code § 2512.
1.

Valuation of Gifts.

Eighth Circuit Rejects Use of Actuarial Tables for
Income Interest in Stock With Minimal Dividend
History, But Rejects Zero Value Rule, Too.

O'Reilly v. Comm'r, 973 F.2d 1403
rev'g and rem'g 95 T.C. 646 (1990).

(8th Cir.

9/1992),

In 1985, an individual created

a grantor retained income trust (GRIT), and assigned to it stock
of several closely-held corporations.

The trustee was given the

power to invest and reinvest the trust assets.
-34-

Historically, the

corporations had paid a dividend of under 1%, but the taxpayer
valued the income interest in the GRIT according to the actuarial
tables in the regulations, which, at that time, assumed a 10% rate
of return. The IRS contended that the retained income interest had
no ascertainable value and, therefore, under Regs. § 25.2512-1,
said that the gift was 100% of the stock's fair market value.

The

Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that the 10% tables
could not be used when the real return on the investment was
clearly far less

than 10%.

The

Court also rejected the

IRS

zero-value analysis, saying that there was a dividend history and
that the stock must be valued according to the actual dividend
history.
2.

Actuarial Tables Inapplicable When Wasting Asset
Will Expire Before Trust's Income Interest.

Froh v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. No. 1 (1/1993).

An individual

assigned $1,500,000 worth of gas leases to three "Clifford" trusts,
requiring that the net income be paid to his children for ten years
and one month, with a reversion in him or his estate.

The trustee

was directed to create a depletion reserve to which 15% of the
income would be credited.

The grantor valued the income interests

by allocating 85% of the $1,500,000 to the income interests and
then

applying

the

discounts

for

a

ten-year

trust

under

then-applicable Regs. § 25.2512-5(f). The Tax Court agreed with the
IRS that the tables could not be applied to the trust income
interest when the asset would expire before the ten-year term of
the-trust.

The Court said that while the use of actuarial tables

is presumptively correct, it is a rebuttable presumption and the
-35-

facts

of this case

showed that

the tables should not

apply.

Therefore, the value of the gift was 85% of the $1,500,000.
3.

IRS Concedes
Control.

Minority

Discount

Despite

Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 I.R.B., p. 13 (1/1993).

Family
The IRS

has finally bowed to the weight of judicial authority and has ruled
that, where a donor gives 20% of the stock of a closely-held
corporation to each of the donor's five children, the factor of
corporate control in the family should not be considered in valuing
the stock for gift tax purposes. Thus, a minority discount is
allowed despite the

fact

that the transferred

interest, when

aggregated with interests held by family members, is part of a
controlling interest.

IV.

SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
A.

Use of Adjacent Guest House Does Not Prejudice QPRT.
Ltr. Rul. 9328040.

An individual proposed to create a

QPRT to hold a 1.65 acre parcel of land that includes a large main
house and a small adjacent ranch house.
used as a vacation house for himself.
of

less

than

4%

of

the

total

The primary property is

The ranch house has a value

value

of

the

property.

He

occasionally permits family members to use the guest house without rent.

The IRS ruled that the trust remained a QPRT, and that

the incidental rent-free use of the guest house by family members
did not mean that the property was used as a residence under Regs.
§ 25.2702-5(c) (2)(iii).
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B.

Favorably Reviewed QPRT Also Taxed as Grantor Trust.
Ltr.

Rul.

9315010.

An

individual

transferred

her

community property interest in a residence to a 20-year QPRT that
required payment of all income to her during the trust's

term.

The

trust provided that she had to agree to pay all expenses relating
to the maintenance of the residence.

The IRS ruled that the trust

was a wholly-owned grantor trust because of the right to receive
income and a power of appointment held by a special trustee who was
a subservient,

related or subordinate party.

Neither the trust

provisions requiring her to pay maintenance costs nor the proposed
sale of a 1/5 remainder interest in the residence trust adversely
affected

the trust's

status as a QPRT.

Because the

grantor

retained no powers over the disposition of the income or principal of the residence trust, upon execution of the trust, the
grantor made a completed gift of 4/5 of the remainder interest to
four trusts established for the benefit of her children.
C.

Private Annuity Bought From Trust is a Qualified Interest
Under Code § 2702.
Ltr. Rul. 9253031.

An individual transferred $5,000,000

in marketable securities to a $19,000,000 trust created in 1933 by
his father.

The trust will pay him an unsecured annuity valued in

accordance with the tables under Code § 7520.

The agreement will

require that he make no other contributions to the trust during his
lifetime and will preclude prepayment of the annuity.

The IRS

ruled that the private annuity arrangement is a qualified interest
under Regs. § 25.2702-3(b) and 25.2702-3(d).
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D.

GRAT Qualified Under Code § 2702; As Grantor Trust It May
Hold

S Corporation Stock; IRB Declines to Value Annuity.

Ltr. Rul. 9248016.
a fixed' quarterly annuity

An individual created a trust to pay
(or, if

greater, all

of the

trust

incme), for 15 years or until his death, whichever first occurs.
Neither he nor his spouse may serve as trustee, and the remainder
beneficiaries are his children and their descendants.
the

nonfiduciary

power

to

reacquire

substituting assets of equivalent value.

the

trust

He retained
assets

by

The IRS ruled that this

was a qualified GRAT, and that the nonfiduciary power to reacquire
assets made the trust an eligible S corporation stockholder. Code
§

6 7 5 -(4

*).* The IRS valued the right to the annuity ignoring the

right to excess income.

It also noted that, because of the size

of the annuity and the trustee's power to invest in speculative
assets (such as the S corporation stock),

the entire trust fund

might be exhausted before the expiration of the 15-year term.
Therefore, the IRS refused to express an opinion regarding the use
of the entire 15-year term in valuing the annuity interest. Citing
Rev.

V.

Rul. 77-454, 1977-2 C.B. 351.

A CRYSTAL BALL
The following items may be considered

legislation during this Congress.
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in future tax

A.

A change in § 2035(d) to clarify when gifts made within

three years of death from a revocable trust are ihcluded in

the

donor's gross estate.

B.

A clarification to § 2207A regarding inadvertent waivers

of the right to recovery for estate taxes attributable to qual'fied
interest property.

C.

A repeal of the "throwback rule" under §§ 665 and 666.

D.

Provisions

to

conform

the

income

tax

treatment

of

revocable trusts (after the death of the grantor) to the manner
estates are treated for income tax purposes.
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